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AERIAL INTRUSIONS BY CIVIL
AIRLINERS AND THE USE OF FORCE
WILLIAM J. HUGHES*
T HE PRINCIPLE that every state has complete and exclusive
sovereignty over the airspace above its territory is now a
fundamental tenet of international law. Most international lawyers
believe the principle has been firmly established as law since
World War I. Indeed, it may be considered to have been one of
the most rapidly accepted customary rules of the twentieth century
The explicit recognition of the principle found in Article 1 of the
Paris Convention of 1919,' and the Chicago Convention of 1944'
was, therefore, merely declaratory of existing customary law on
the subject."
The comprehensive claim which states assert to authority over
the airspace above their territory,' expressed in the familiar terms
of "sovereignty," corresponds very closely to their most compre-
hensive claim with respect to the land masses themselves. One
aspect of this claim is the comprehensive and continuing, even
* Attorney with Alexander Anolik, A Professional Law Corporation, San
Francisco, California; B.A., 1973, Stanford University; Juris Doctor, 1977, Hast-
ings College of Law; Diploma in Air and Space Law, 1979, London Institute of
World Affairs; LL.M., 1979, University of London.
I Gihl, The Legal Character and Sources of International Law, 1 SCANDINAVIAN
STUD. L. 51, 80-81 (1957).
2 Paris Convention for the Regulation of Air Navigation (1919), 11 L.N.T.S.
173 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention of 1919].
' Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944), 3 C. BEVANS,
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 1776-1949, MULTILATERAL 1931-1945, at 944 [hereinafter cited as Chi-
cago Convention of 1944].
4 M. McDOUGAL, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 259-60 (1965).
5 "Territory" is defined in Article 2 of the Chicago Convention of 1944: "For
the purposes of this Convention the territory of a State shall be deemed to be
the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty,
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State."
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arbitrary, exclusive competence to control access to and the use
of, the airspace above their national territory.' It is a claim, as
put by Professor J.C. Cooper, to the "sole unilateral right to con-
trol all flight in the airspace above its land and waters," encom-
passing "every type of flight instrumentality," and "subject to no
qualifications other than those to which it voluntarily agrees."'
It is axiomatic from this principle that no aircraft is normally
entitled to enter the airspace above the territory of a foreign
state without the latter's permission. The question, however, ulti-
mately arises as to the status and standards of treatment of an
aircraft which in fact enters without such permission. Is such an
aircraft completely at the mercy of the territorial sovereign? Does
the right to destroy the aerial intruder8 logically inhere in "com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty"? Or does international law im-
pose certain restraints, upon the territorial sovereign in dealing with
such aircraft?
Unlike Professor Lissitzyn's authoritative article! on the treat-
ment of aerial intruders which considers military or state aircraft
together with civil aircraft, the discussion to follow will differ-
entiate between the two classes of aircraft and confine itself to
aerial intrusions by civil airliners. The essential differences be-
tween intrusions by military and non-military aircraft will be dis-
cussed below. The treatment of intruding civil airliners, par-
ticularly the use of force against such aircraft, is, by no means an
academic question. During the period between 1952 and 1978,
some five regularly scheduled airliners have been fired upon after
unauthorized intrusions into national airspace." All of these inci-
dents resulted in the death or injury of many if not all passengers
and crew aboard.
O M. McDOUGAL, supra note 4, at 254.
107 CONG. REc. A633, A634-35 (1961) (report of J.C. Cooper, "Flight-
Space Law").
' Aircraft entering airspace without permission are referred to in this paper
as "intruder" or "intruding aircraft."
' Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and Inter-
national Law, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 559 (1953).
10 See text at section II infra.
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I. NON-MILITARY INTRUDERS MUST BE CONSIDERED
DISTINCT FROM MILITARY INTRUDERS
It is submitted that non-military intruders must be considered
as distinct from military intruders and therefore should not be
treated similarly by the offended territorial sovereign. Support for
this proposition is found in international conventions, state prac-
tice and opinio juris.
The Convention for the Regulation of Air Navigation" signed
at Paris in 1919 demonstrates an early acceptance of a distinction
between military and non-military aircraft. Article 32 provided
that "no military aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the
territory of another contracting State nor land thereon without
special authorization." Each party to the convention, on the other
hand, undertook to accord, in time of peace, freedom of innocent
passage above its territory to the civil aircraft of the other party
with the exception of aircraft engaged in scheduled services.1 The
Convention on International Civil Aviation" drafted in 1944,
which has for all practical purposes superseded the Paris Conven-
tion, makes similar distinctions. The state aircraft of a party are
forbidden to fly over or land in the territory of another state with-
out authorization."' There is, however, a general right of transit
and non-traffic stops for the civil aircraft, other than those en-
gaged in scheduled international air services, of every party to the
convention." It must be pointed out by way of clarification that
the reason a right of transit or innocent passage was denied
scheduled civil air services was rooted in economic rather than
security considerations. The grant of such a right was intended
to be the subject of a separate bilateral or multilateral agreement
between the states concerned, based on reciprocity. A privilege of
transit and non-traffic stops for aircraft on scheduled international
air services is granted in the separate International Air Services
"1 Paris Convention of 1919, supra note 2.
12 Id. arts. 2, 15.
"1 Chicago Convention of 1944, supra note 3.
1 Article 3(b) of the Chicago Convention of 1944, supra note 3, provides
that, "Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be deemed to
be State aircraft ....
5 id. arts. 5, 6.
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Transit Agreement also signed at Chicago in 1944.1"
That the United States views a distinction between military in-
truders and civil intruders to be important seems clear, although
mainly by negative implication. The case of the American U-2
high altitude reconnaissance plane shot down on May 1, 1960,
deep within Soviet territory, is illustrative. It must be noted that
the United States did not formally challenge the right of the
Soviets to shoot down the U-2," which is clearly a state and not
a civil plane under the definition of Article 3(b) of the Chicago
Convention. On other occasions when an American military plane
has been shot down by the Soviet Union or another Socialist state,
on the allegation that it was flying over the territory or territorial
waters of that state, including the RB-47 incident which occurred
after the U-2 incident, the United States has protested on the
ground that its plane was not over foreign territory or had gone
there accidentally rather than on the ground of an illegal use of
force." These reactions to the use of force against intruding United
States military craft can be sharply contrasted to American re-
actions as to the use of force against civil aircraft discussed below.
The Soviet Union, which jealously guards its air frontiers with
frequent resort to the use of force against intruders, nonetheless
appears implicitly to distinguish between state and civil aircraft,
albeit on a functional basis. In regard to the Soviet attitude on
aerial intruders in the context of the U-2 incident, Korovin states:
The fact that a violation of airspace, or to use Herter's expression,
'penetration' is sometimes effected, as the U.S. affirms, by 'un-
armed', 'civil' aircraft, does not alter matters. Whatever category a
plane formally belongs to, its character is determined by the
function it performs, a plane used for military purposes will always
be regarded as a reconnaissance plane, just like a transport plane
used as a bomber, cannot expect to be treated as a commercial
aircraft.'
16 International Air Services Transit Agreement (1944), C. BEVANS, supra
note 3, at 922. See generally B. CHENG, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR
TRANSPORT (1962).
11 Lissitzyn, Some Legal Implications of the U-2 and RB-47 Incidents, 56 AM.
J. INT'L L. 135, 137 (1962); M. McDOUGAL, supra note 4, at 274-75.
"I Lissitzyn, supra note 17, at 139; Wright, Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident,
54 AM. J. INT'L L. 836, 845-46 (1960).
19 Korovin, Aerial Espionage and International Law, INT'L AFFAIRS 49, 50
(1960).
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It would thus appear that an aircraft that was in fact a civil
commercial aircraft would be treated differently from an aircraft
functioning as a state aircraft.
State practice regarding the treatment of aerial intruders further
dictates that a distinction be made between military and non-
military aircraft. Most aerial incidents involving an intruding
foreign military aircraft and Soviet fighters for example, are of
limited value in an analysis of state practice or opinio juris. As
Professor McDougal bluntly observes, it would be futile to en-
gage in prolonged description of the numerous incidents involving
American and Soviet military aircraft that have occurred after
World War II, since the published documentation about most of
the incidents discloses basic disagreement with respect to the
facts.' Disputes about the facts usually relate to five fundamental
issues:"'
(1) whether the intrusion was intended or unintended;
(2) whether the incident occurred within or outside Soviet terri-
torial airspace;
(3) the true nature of the flight, be it reconnaissance or non-
offensive;
(4) whether warning issued before fire opened; and,
(5) who opened fire first.
Of these five fundamental issues, most do not apply to, nor have
they been raised with respect to use of force against intruding
civil airliners.
The issue of who fired first, intruder or interceptor, has been
central to most disputes involving incidents between Soviet and
American military aircraft. The Soviet Union has maintained that
the intruder in question was fired upon by interceptors only in
response to unprovoked fire from the intruding plane or to a de-
liberate intrusion in the B-29 incident of 1952,2 the P-2-Y "Nep-
tune" incident of 1954' and the RB-47 incident of 1960.24 This
consistently disputed issue obviously does not arise in connection
with the use of force against civil airliners. Another issue hotly
20 M. McDOUGAL, supra note 4, at 272-73.
21 See Lissitzyn, supra note 9, at 570.
2' Aerial Incident of Oct. 7, 1952, U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R., I.C.J. Pleadings 29.
23 Aerial Incident of Sept. 4, 1954, U.S.A. v. U.S.S.R., I.C.J. Pleadings 19.
21 Lissitzyn, supra note 17, at 139.
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contested in incidents involving military aircraft is whether such
aircraft did in fact intrude into territorial airspace. There has rarely
been any controversy as to whether the civil airliner was within
or outside the airspace of the territorial state which had used force
against it. Nor have the issues of the willfulness or nature of the
intrusion received substantial debate in the case of civilian in-
trusions. The only major issue in common with intrusions by mili-
tary aircraft which has' arisen in the airliner incidents has been
that of whether a warning was issued before firing. And even this
common issue is clouded by the fact that some western states deny
a right to use force against intruding airliners even if a warning
is issued first.
Therefore, it must be concluded both on legal and functional
grounds that the treatment of aerial intrusions by military aircraft
be dealt with as distinct from intrusions by non-military aircraft.
While the attitude of states toward military intruders shows little
consensus, it is submitted that attitudes toward intruding civil air-
liners are far more uniform, and that certain standards with regard
to the treatment of such civilian intruders may be regarded as
established. A review of the incidents since 1952 wherein force
has been used against intruding airliners, coupled with an analysis
of the reactions of the party states and the community of states
will support such a proposition.
II. INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST
AIRLINERS (1952-1978)
The following incidents may be considered as the most im-
portant examples to date of the use of force by an offended terri-
torial sovereign against an intruding airliner not only due to the
gravity of the consequential damages but equally for the opinio
juris generated by them.
The first such incident took place on April 29, 1952, when an
Air France plane on a scheduled flight from Frankfurt to Berlin
was attacked by Soviet fighters.' The fighters made three or four
separate attacks, employing cannon and machine gun fire." The
" London Times, Apr. 30, 1952, at 6; see generally De La Pradelle, Les
Frontiers De L'Air, 2 RECUEIL DES COURS 187 (1954).
26 London Times, Apr. 30, 1952, at 6.
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airliner managed a miraculous landing in Berlin despite serious
damage to both starboard engines and fuel tanks." Two passengers
were severely injured by bullets, and three other passengers and
the copilot were injured by metal splinters. 8
There was in this case some disagreement as to the question of
actual intrusion by the Air France plane. A few minutes before the
attack the pilot had obtained a position report which showed him
to be well within the boundaries of the twenty mile wide Berlin
corridor. 9 The Soviet protest alleged however that the airliner had
violated Soviet air regulations, presumably by an unauthorized
entry into its airspace.'
The reactions by the West however, centered on the right of
the Soviet Union to take such action against a civil airliner.
While the Allied High Commissioners in Germany in a joint pro-
test denied the aircraft was outside the corridor, they made the
following statement: "Quite apart from these questions of fact,
to fire, in any circumstances, even by way of warning, on an un-
armed aircraft in time of peace, wherever that aircraft may be, is
entirely inadmissible, and contrary to all standards of civilized
behavior."31 The Allied High Commissioners and the British,
American, and French Commandants in Berlin requested the
Soviet Union to conduct an immediate investigation of the incident,
punish those responsible, and make reparations for resulting ma-
terial damage to persons and property."
The Soviet Union for its part issued a strong protest as to the
actions of the French airliner. It was maintained that the airliner
violated Soviet air regulations and refused to obey orders by inter-
ceptors to land. A further, and not unrevealing contention, was that
the shots fired by a single fighter were intended as a warning to
the Air France plane to land and were not meant to down the
intruder. '




30 Id.; see also Lissitzyn, supra note 9, at 574.
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from Bangkok to Hong Kong was shot down ten miles east of the
international air corridor off Hainan Island by fighters of the
People's Republic of China.' Two passengers were killed by
fire from the interceptors and numerous others drowned after the
crippled airliner ditched into heavy seas.' Captain Blown, who
survived the crash, stated that the Chinese fighters attacked with-
out the slightest warning and "shot to kill," aiming at the petrol
tanks with a continuous stream of bullets."
The reaction from the West was one of uniform condemnation
and outrage over this use of force by the Chinese interceptors.
Further, both the United Kingdom and the United States demanded
that the People's Republic of China pay compensation for the
damage to persons and property caused by the fighter attack.
Mr. Dulles declared in a statement from Washington, "[t]he United
States Government takes the gravest view of this act of further
barbarity for which the Chinese Government must be held re-
sponsible.""8
The Chinese initially remained silent as to any possible re-
sponsibility for the downing of the Cathay Pacific airliner. How-
ever, after the demand by the British Charge d'Affaires for ade-
quate compensation, the Chinese immediately informed the British
government that they took responsibility for the incident and were
willing to consider appropriate compensation for the loss of life
and damage to property." They maintained that the airliner had
been fired upon by accident as it was mistaken for a Kuomintang
aircraft on a mission of aggression.'
One of the most striking incidents involving the use of force
against an intruding airliner, both in terms of loss of life and re-
sponse by the international community, occurred on July 27,
1955. " A Constellation airliner of Israel Airlines (the ElAl Coin-
London Times, July 24, 1954, at 6; see generally De La Pradelle, supra
note 25, at 187-88.






41 KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVEs 14359 (August 1955).
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pany), flying from London to Israel via Paris, Vienna and Istanbul,
was shot down by Bulgarian fighters near the Greco-Bulgarian
border. ' All fifty-one passengers on board were killed, as well as
the crew of seven.'
On July 28, the Bulgarian government issued a communique
saying the airliner had departed from its route and entered Bul-
garian airspace without warning, and that anti-aircraft defenses
had opened fire on the plane which they had been unable to
identify.' This communique is noteworthy as the Bulgarians are
deliberately misstating the manner in which the airliner was shot
down. The actual circumstances, as later revealed, were that the
EIAI plane was fired upon by fighters which were clearly in a posi-
tion to identify the aircraft.' The Bulgarians were hesitant to let
the actual circumstances surrounding the incident be known.
On the next day, July 29, the Israeli government sent two
strongly worded notes to Bulgaria. The first denounced the attack
on the airliner as "shocking recklessness" and "a wanton disre-
gard for human life and for elementary obligations of humanity,"
and demanded the punishment of those responsible, as well as full
compensation for the loss of the aircraft and for the families of
the passengers and crews.' The second note protested the Bul-
garian government's refusal to permit an Israeli investigating team
to enter Bulgaria to examine the wreckage of the airliner.""
Israeli civil aviation experts were eventually allowed to enter
Bulgaria and inspect the wreckage of the plane. Their report, pub-
lished on August 1, stated that the plane was riddled with machine
gun bullets indicating it had been shot down by fighters, and that
the Bulgarian authorities had tampered with the wreckage in an
attempt to remove incriminating evidence and had generally im-
peded their investigation."
The passengers in the aircraft included British, Canadian, South
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Israeli citizens. In addition to the Protest Notes from Israel, strong
protests were made to Bulgaria by the British government (acting
also on behalf of Canada and South Africa), and by the United
States, French, and Swedish governments. The British Note stated
that "H.M. Government cannot accept that any Government is
in its right in shooting down a civil aircraft in time of peace. '
The United States Note declared that the "brutal attack" on the
Israeli airliner was a "grave violation of all principles of interna-
tional law."' The French government described the Bulgarian
action as an "act of war."" All the Protest Notes demanded the
punishment of those responsible and the payment of full com-
pensation to the families of those who had been killed.
The Bulgarian government issued a statement on August 3, ad-
mitting that the E1AI airliner had been shot down by two Bulgarian
fighters and not, as originally claimed, by anti-aircraft fire." Fur-
ther, it promised to "discover and punish those responsible for the
catastrophe," and to take "all measures to prevent a repetition of
such incidents," and to pay compensation to the families of the
fifty-eight victims." The statement, claimed to be based on the
findings of the Ministerial Commission of Inquiry, said that fighters
had been sent to investigate the deep penetration of Bulgarian air-
space, but the airliner had ignored their signal to land." Believing
that the plane was "trying to escape across the frontier," they had
opened fire on the airliner, which had caught fire and crashed.
The statement admitted that the air defenses had "shown hastiness"
and had failed to take all necessary measures to force the aircraft
to change direction.'
The United States, United Kingdom, and Israeli governments
also submitted applications to the International Court of Justice
instituting proceedings on the E1A1 incident against the government








£6 Aerial Incident of July, 1955, Israel v. Bulgaria; United States v. Bulgaria;
United Kingdom v. Bulgaria, I.C.J. Pleadings.
AERIAL INTRUSIONS
are a rich source of opinio juris for these three states on the right
to use force against intruding airliners.
The general position taken by the United States is perhaps best
illustrated by the following statement from its Memorial: "re-
gardless of the explanation for the aircraft's entering Bulgarian
airspace, no pilot of a civil airliner would expect to be shot down
without being given a safe alternative, and without the opportunity
to keep himself, his passengers, and his crew from being killed.""7
The position of Israel taken in its Memorial was similar in
spirit, "The Government of Israel will . . . argue that in normal
times there can be no legal justification for haste, and inadequate
measures after interception of, and for the opening of fire on, a
foreign civil aircraft, clearly marked as such."'" The British atti-
tude was more categorical. The following passage from its Me-
morial is useful by way of summary:
The Government of the United Kingdom submits that there can
be no justification in international law for the destruction, by a
State using armed force, of a foreign civil aircraft, clearly identifi-
able as such, which is on a scheduled passenger flight, even if that
aircraft enters without previous authorization the airspace of the
territory of that State."
The legal arguments contained in these Memorials in support
of the proposition that the Bulgarian action was illegal under inter-
national law warrant further inquiry. All three Memorials relied
strongly on the principles illustrated by the judgment of the Inter-
national Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case.' The judg-
ment was cited as' evidence that international law condemns ac-
tions by states which in time of peace unnecessarily or recklessly
involve risk to the lives of the nationals of other states or destruc-
tion of their property. In the well-known Corfu Channel case, the
International Court based Albania's duty to warn shipping vessels
of the presence of a mine field in its territorial waters on "general
and well-recognized principles," one of which was "elementary
7 1Id., Memorial of the United States, at 210.
lId., Memorial of Israel, at 89.
I d., Memorial of the United Kingdom, at 358.
o Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
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The British and American Memorials also cited the case of
Garcia v. United States," as additional support for the proposition
that certain minimum or elementary considerations of humanity
exist which are of a legal nature, and to elucidate the content of
such principles.' In the Garcia case, which was decided by the
Mexico-United States General Claims Commission, an American
officer opened fire with a rifle on a raft which had crossed the Rio
Grande River from the Mexican to the American side and was just
setting out on the return journey. The officer stated that he fired
from some distance, with no intent of hitting anybody, but with the
object of frightening the persons on the raft. A small child aboard
the raft was killed. The majority of the Commission held that the
action by the American officer was illegal. In particular, it stated
that the act of firing in such circumstances should not be indulged
in "unless the importance of preventing or repressing the delin-
quency by firing is in reasonable proportion to the danger arising
from it to the lives of the culprits and other persons in their neigh-
borhood," nor should it be used "when other practicable ways of
preventing or repressing the delinquency might be available.""4
The United Kingdom submitted that the shooting down of the
E1A1 plane was contrary to the Charter of the United Nations. The
Charter commends all members of the United Nations under para-
graph four of Article 2, to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The British
maintained that the use of armed force against aircraft is not
justified in international law nor under Article 51 of the United
Nations Charter, unless it is used in the legitimate exercise of
self-defense.' It submitted that the use of force against a foreign
airliner, clearly identifiable as such, cannot be justified even if
61 Id. at 22.
4 Garcia Case (Mexico v. United States), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119 (1928).
' Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 59, at 362.
"Garcia Case (Mexico v. United States), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 119 (1928).
1 Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 59, at 358.
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that aircraft enters the airspace above a state without previous
authorization.
The United Kingdom also maintained that no justification for
the use of force against civil aircraft on a scheduled flight which
makes an unauthorized entry into the airspace of another state
can be derived from the Paris Convention of 1919 or the Chicago
Convention of 1944." Both conventions provide that contracting
states may establish areas in which, for military reasons or in the
interests of public safety, the entry of aircraft of other contracting
states may be prohibited."7 Under Article 4 of the Paris Conven-
tion, an aircraft finding itself above a prohibited area established
under Article 3 of that convention must, as soon as it is aware of
the fact, give the signal of distress provided for in paragraph
seventeen of Annex D to the Paris Convention, and land as soon
as possible outside the prohibited area at one of the nearest aero-
dromes of the state whose territory it has entered. Under paragraph
(c) of Article 9 of the Chicago Convention, each contracting state,
under such regulations as it may prescribe, may require any air-
craft entering one of the restricted or prohibited areas," "to effect
a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some designated air-
port within its territory." The United Kingdom contended that
"since the Conventions on Aerial Navigation do not sanction the
use of force against aircraft flying above prohibited or restricted
areas, no Contracting State can be in any stronger position against
civil aircraft on scheduled flights which overfly other areas of
their territory without permission.""
All three Memorials submitted to the International Court raised
the well-established principle of international law, grounded in
considerations of humanity, recognizing for ships a right of
entry into the territory of a foreign state in cases of overriding
necessity or distress. Numerous cases and authorities were cited
and discussed in support of this maritime doctrine. It was uni-
formly maintained that there is, on the analogy of this right of
"Id. at 363.
67 Paris Convention of 1919, supra note 2, at art. 3; Chicago Convention of
1944, supra note 3, at art. 9.
68 The establishment of restricted or prohibited areas is provided for in Article
9(a) of the Chicago Convention of 1944, supra note 3.
6" Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 59, at 364.
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entry to sovereign ports for ships in distress, a right of entry into
the airspace of a foreign state for aircraft in distress. While it was
conceded that this right is not specifically recognized in either
the Paris or Chicago Conventions on Aerial Navigation, it was
pointed out that both require a certain degree of assistance to be
provided by the territorial state for aircraft of contracting states
in cases of distress. Article 22 of the Paris Convention provided
that "Aircraft of the contracting States shall be entitled to the
same measures of assistance for landing, particularly in case of
distress, as national aircraft." Article 25 of the Chicago Convention
is headed "Aircraft in Distress" and reads as follows:
Each contracting State undertakes to provide such measures of
assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find
practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own authori-
ties, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State in
which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of assist-
ance as may be necessitated by the circumstances ....
The United States considered the Bulgarian government in vio-
lation of the principle articulated in Article 25 of the Chicago
Convention and added, "[tlhat governments owe a duty of safety
to overflying passengers and crew and a duty not to kill or destroy
or tolerate destruction and pilferage, is plain."'
Each Memorial also contained the respective state's opinion as
to the proper remedy for the intrusion by the E1A1 airliner, or any
such airliner. The British Memorial categorically rejected the use
of force as a proper remedy. The United States and Israel, while
generally rejecting the use of armed force against an intruding air-
liner, were less categorical in their responses. The American opin-
ion was that the issue of the legality of the use of force in this
situation could not even arise unless the offended territorial state
raised an articulable security necessity caused by the intrusion
and had already exhausted certain preliminary measures. The
Israelis stressed what they considered to be the normal reaction
of the territorial state to an unauthorized infringement of its air-
space.
The British position was simply that the proper remedy of the
offended territorial sovereign is through diplomatic channels.
°M. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 (1968).
AERIAL INTRUSIONS
Reference was made to the incident in which an unarmed United
States military air transport was shot down over Yugoslavia on
August 19, 1946, and the incident's ultimate resolution was cited
with approval.' The Yugoslav government, although offering
compensation on an ex gratia basis only, stated that orders had
been given that in the future, transport aircraft should not be
fired at, even in cases of intentional overflight, but should be
invited to land. If they refused, their identity would be noted and
the necessary steps taken through diplomatic channels."
It was also noted that the government of the United Kingdom
had affirmed the proposition that the appropriate remedy, in the
case of an alleged violation of airspace, is for the state which
alleges such violation first to attempt to obtain satisfaction from
the owner of the aircraft, and failing this, to take the matter up
through the diplomatic channels with the state whose nationality
the aircraft bears. '
The United States Memorial maintained that no pilot of a civil
.airliner would expect to be shot down without being given a safe
alternative and without an adequate opportunity to keep himself,
his passengers, and his crew from being killed.' The Memorial
continued:
A safe alternative means that the airplane should either have been
told from the ground, by voice radio, or by CW transmission, on
an international radio frequency used by airplanes in flight, or
should have been told by the fighters intercepting it, that it was
off course. It should then have been either escorted back to Yugo-
slavia, or even to Greece. If there were Bulgarian terrain security
positions already raised, AX-AKC should have been given com-
prehensible communications to lead it to a designated airport
with safety for the crew, the passengers and the aircraft.'
Any firing would have been unnecessary, the United States argued,
since the pilots of the fighter planes had an opportunity to identify
71 Memorial of the United Kingdom, supra note 59, at 363.
72 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 505 (1946).
" The government of the United Kingdom affirmed this procedure for redress
on December 5, 1955, at the 682nd meeting of the Third Committee of the
General Assembly of the United Nations (10th Session). See Memorial of the
United Kingdom, supra note 59, at 363.
"Memorial of the United States, supra note 57, at 210.
Is Id.
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the ElAl plane from its appearance and markings and to report
them to the Bulgarian ground authorities. The latter, in accord-
ance with the present practice of civilized nations, then would
take the matter up in appropriate diplomatic channels with the
government of Israel."8
The United States finally maintained that should there have
been a security necessity, which Bulgaria did not claim and could
not claim in this case, to bring the airliner down, only reason-
able methods for doing so could be used. An airfield of proper
facilities must have been shown to the pilot of the E1A1 plane,
and the intercepting fighters must have led him there." The
United States concluded, "[albove all, it has not been stated or
demonstrated that it was necessary to effect any landing for the
security of Bulgaria or any other internationally proper reason. To
have any semblance of international legal validity such evidence
would be essential.""8
The Israeli Memorial stated that in time of peace it is normal
for the offended territorial state to react in one or both of two
ways. The first remedy or reaction is to require the intruder to
return to its authorized position within or without the airspace of
the state in question or to require the intruder to submit to exami-
nation after landing at a place in the territory of the state in ques-
tion, effectively indicated to it in an appropriate manner."9 It
stressed that all actions and instructions must be appropriate and
not cause an undue degree of physical danger to the aircraft and
its occupants. The second remedy is for the territorial state to sub-
sequently deal with the infringement of its sovereignty by making
the appropriate d~marche through its diplomatic channels."0
The merits of the various arguments as to the status of the use
of force against intruding civil airliners under international law
were unfortunately never reached by the International Court of
Justice. The cases brought by Israel, the United States, and the
United Kingdom against Bulgaria were ultimately removed from
7
" Id.
" Id. at 236.
78 Id. at 242.
" Memorial of Israel, supra note 58, at 87.
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the Court's List for want of jurisdiction over Bulgaria."'
The most serious incident in terms of loss of life occurred on
February 21, 1973, when a Libyan Airlines Boeing 727 was shot
down by Israeli fighters over Israeli-occupied Sinai.' The Libyan
airliner, on a flight from Tripoli to Cairo, overflew Cairo, passing
the Israeli-Egyptian cease fire line, and intruded some twelve
miles into occupied Sinai before being fired on by Israeli intercep-
tors.' The airliner crash-landed, which resulted in the destruction
of the aircraft and loss of 108 lives."
Vehement criticism of the action by the Israeli fighters was made
by Egypt. Cairo Radio described the incident as "a monstrous and
savage crime which is full of perfidy and which is not only a vio-
lation of international law but of all human values."' It went on
to say that "it is premeditated murder of unarmed civilians includ-
ing women and children."" Mr. Ahmed Nouh, Egyptian Civil
Aviation Minister, denounced the action as a violation of inter-
national law."' Mr. Nouh also produced tapes of the Libyan air-
liner's conversation with Egyptian air traffic controllers in support
of certain allegations as to the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent. The tapes, it was alleged, confirmed that the four Israeli
fighters attacked without warning. As Egyptian air traffic control
was monitoring the same radio frequency as the Libyan airliner,
it was, argued that any radio warning to the airliner would have
been picked up and recorded in Cairo. Further, the tapes indi-
cated that the pilot realized he had lost direction and was in com-
munication with Egyptian controllers just before the shots were
fired.
Israel pointed out that the airliner violated airspace over a very
sensitive Israeli-controlled area, namely occupied Sinai. Mr. Shi-
mon Peres, Israel's Minister of Transport, stated that "Israel acted
in accord with international law, defended its airspace and did
" See generally Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 AM.
J. INT'L L. 357 (1962).







JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
what was required after serious consideration."" Israel maintained
that the pilot of the Libyan plane refused to heed repeated warn-
ings which were conveyed according to international usages." The
Israeli fighter pilots responsible for the incident claimed they only
tried to damage the aircraft to force it down and did not intend
to shoot it down."0
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) took a
very strong and important position vis h vis this incident. The
ICAO Council, on March 5, 1973, instructed the Secretary Gen-
eral to institute a fact finding technical investigation on the des-
truction of the Libyan airliner. A team was formed of five experts,
drawn entirely from the ICAO Secretariat. The Council examined
the report of the team on June 4, 1973, and adopted the follow-
ing resolution:
THE COUNCIL,
RECALLING that the United Nations Security Council in its Reso-
lution 262 in 1969 condemned Israel for its premeditated action
against Beirut Civil Airport which resulted in the destruction of
thirteen commercial and civil aircraft, and recalling that the As-
sembly of ICAO in its Resolution A19-1 [February 1973] con-
demned the Israeli action which resulted in the loss of 108 innocent
lives and directed the Council to instruct the Secretary General to
institute an investigation and report to the Council;
CONVINCED that such actions constitute a serious danger against
the safety of international civil aviation;
Recognizing that such attitude is a flagrant violation of the prin-
ciples enshrined in the Chicago Convention;
Having considered the report of the investigation team established
by the Secretary General in accordance with the Resolution A19-1,
and finding from it no justification for the shooting down of the
Libyan civil aircraft;
(1) Strongly condemns the Israeli action which resulted in the
destruction of the Libyan civil aircraft and the loss of 108
innocent lives;
(2) Urges Israel to comply with the aims and objectives of the
Chicago Convention."'
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The most recent incident involving the use of force against an
intruding airliner occurred on April 20, 1978." A Korean Air
Lines (KAL) Boeing 707 after entering Soviet airspace had been
directed down by one or more Soviet fighter aircraft, one of which
fired at the airliner, killing two passengers and injuring eleven
others." The KAL plane which was on a polar flight from Paris to
Seoul, with a scheduled stop for refueling at Anchorage, made a
forced landing on a frozen lake, 230 miles south of Murmansk."
The area where the airliner was intercepted, near the White Sea
coast, is a Soviet high security zone closed to foreigners."
Reaction by South Korea, which had no diplomatic relations
with the U.S.S.R., was somewhat surprising in light of the previ-
ously reported incidents. Far from protesting the Soviet action, the
President of South Korea, Park Chung Hee, expressed his grati-
tude to the Soviet Union for the speedy return of the passengers
and crew members-this being in fact the first direct message
ever sent to the Soviet Union by the government of South Korea."
Later on May 1, Mr. Park Tong Jin, the South Korean Foreign
Minister, again expressly thanked the Soviet Union for the release
of the airliner's captain and navigator."' South Korea did not re-
buke the Soviet Union for firing on the KAL plane. Nor did other
states, who have taken positions with regard to such incidents
in the past, condemn the Soviet Union publicly. This attitude may
perhaps be explained by the circumstances surrounding the firing
on the airliner as reported by the Soviet Union which were un-
challenged by South Korea.
According to an initial Soviet announcement on April 21,
the KAL airliner had entered Soviet airspace on a south-bound
flight from the Barents Sea, had not complied with orders given
by Soviet fighters, and had not landed until two hours after enter-
ing Soviet airspace." The Soviet authorities later claimed that after
being intercepted the airliner had attempted to change course west-
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wards in order to fly to Finland." Later, according to a statement
issued by Tass on April 29, the official Soviet investigation had
established that the airliner's crew had failed "to abide by the
international rules of flight" and had "refused to obey the demands
of Soviet fighter planes of the air defence to follow them in order
to land at an airfield." The pilot and navigator had pleaded guilty
to violating Soviet airspace and the border, and also the interna-
tional rules of flying, and they had confirmed that they had under-
stood the orders of the Soviet aircraft but had not obeyed them.'
After reviewing the five prominent incidents of the use of force
by offended territorial sovereign states against an intruding civil
airliner in phenomenological fashion, certain patterns of state
opinion and practice emerge. Standards of treatment for civil
aerial intruders may be induced from these incidents.
Ill. SUMMARY: STATE OPINION AND PRACTICE ARTICULATED
IN THE INCIDENTS REVIEWED
One striking aspect of all these incidents is the absence of a
claim by any of the offended territorial states to an unqualified
right to use force against the intruding airliner. None of the terri-
torial sovereigns simply asserted that the aircraft was shot down
for its unauthorized entry and that such action was consistent with
its rights and obligations under international law. Aggravating
circumstances were claimed in each instance to justify the use of
force.
The most common aggravating factor cited by territorial states
employing armed force was the failure or refusal of the intruding
aircraft to follow the instructions of intercepting fighters. The
Soviet Union advanced the failure of the intruder to follow instruc-
tions to land as justification for firing in both incidents reviewed. 1
The Bulgarian government, after initially maintaining that the
ElAl plane was shot down as an unidentified intruder by anti-
aircraft batteries, claimed the airliner refused instructions to land.1
9Id.
100 Id.
101 See London Times, Apr. 30, 1952, at 6; KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY AR-
CHIVES 29060 (June, 1978).
10 2 KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 14359 (August, 1955).
AERIAL INTRUSIONS
Israel maintained in the incident of February 21, 1973, that the
Libyan airliner refused to heed repeated warnings." The People's
Republic of China claimed that the Cathay Pacific plane was at-
tacked by accident near Hainan Island as it was mistaken for a
Kuomintang aggressor.' While the veracity of these claims may
be disputed, it is important and revealing that all the states felt
compelled to advance them.
It may, therefore, be initially concluded that there is no sup-
port for the proposition that territorial states, have an unqualified
right to use force against intruding civil airliners. State opinion,
however, appears to diverge somewhat on the question whether
force may ever be lawfully used against such an airliner in time
of peace. This divergence of opinion, while never actually that
great, has narrowed over time, merging into consensus.
In the earlier incidents reviewed, the opinions of the western
powers seem quite categorical. The legitimacy of firing on a civil
airliner was' completely denied or denied in the particular factual
situation. The Allied High Commissioners in Germany, in their
joint protest over the Berlin corridor incident of April 29, 1952,
flatly stated that firing on an unarmed aircraft in time of peace is
entirely inadmissible and contrary to all standards of civilized
behavior.1" The Bulgarian incident of July 27, 1955, provoked
similar responses from the West. The British Note to Bulgaria
stated that "H.M. Government cannot accept that any Govern-
ment is in its right in shooting down a civil aircraft in time of
peace. "" ' The United States, however, was less categorical, al-
though calling the incident a violation of international law. The
United States maintained that regardless of the explanation for
the ElA1 plane entering Bulgarian airspace, no pilot of a civilian
airliner would expect to be shot down without being given a safe
alternative.""7 A safe alternative was considered to mean that the
airliner would be notified that it was off course and interceptors
would lead it out of Bulgarian airspace or to a designated air-
"3 See London Times, Feb. 23, 1973, at 1.
104 See London Times, July 24, 1954, at 6.
101 London Times, April 30, 1952, at 6.
106 KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 14359 (August, 1955).
107 Memorial of the United States, supra note 57, at 210.
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port."' The United States Memorial also stated that in any case
there should be a security necessity for the territorial sovereign to
bring the plane down to the ground, and only reasonable methods
for doing so could be used."" Thus, the United States opinion as
early as 1955 begins to beg the question whether a territorial state,
which claims a security necessity, may bring down an airliner by
the use of armed force if it refuses to comply with instructions given
by interceptors to land.
The United Kingdom, in its Memorial to the International
Court, contended that since the Paris and Chicago Conventions on
Aerial Navigation do not sanction the use of force against aircraft
flying above prohibited or restricted zones, no contracting state
can be in any stronger position against civil aircraft "on scheduled
flights which overfly other areas of their territory without per-
m ission. "1 °
The Chicago Convention, at Article 9(c), provides that each
contracting state may require any aircraft entering a prohibited
area to effect a landing as soon as practicable thereafter at some
designated airport within its territory. Therefore, the British con-
tention that contracting states are not authorized to use force as a
remedy for the unauthorized intrusion of a civil aircraft appears
quite correct. It is submitted, however, that the British contention
cannot be broadly interpreted. It seems clear that Article 9 (c) of
the Chicago Convention would deny contracting states the right
to use force as a primary remedy for aerial intrusions into a pro-
hibited zone or, by reasonable implication, intrusions in other
areas. The primary and initial remedy is to require the intruder
to land. Yet neither the Paris nor the Chicago Conventions ex-
plicitly limit the police power of states as to the methods which
may be employed to enforce regulations on aerial navigation.
The ICAO made certain interpretations as to the legitimacy of
the use of force against intruding airliners under the Chicago
Convention in its response to the Sinai incident of February 21,
1973. The ICAO Council strongly condemned the Israeli action
which resulted in the downing of a Libyan airliner and the death of
10
o Id. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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108 persons on board. The Council considered that the Israeli atti-
tude toward the use of force in such situations constituted a "flag-
rant violation of the principles enshrined in the Chicago Conven-
tion."'' . No specific articles or provisions were cited. The Council
did not declare, however, that any use of force under any circum-
stances would be a violation of the Convention. Rather, after con-
sidering the report of the investigation team established in accord
with an Assembly resolution, the Council found no justification
for shooting on the intruding airliner. The Council impliedly
rejected Israel's proffered aggravating circumstances justification:
violation of airspace over a very sensitive area and failure of the
Libyan airliner to heed warnings."'
The Sinai incident is also illuminating in that in 1955 it was
Israel, in her protests to Bulgaria, who vehemently denied the
legitimacy of the use of force against intrusions by civil air-
liners. In 1973, however, Israel was claiming a right to use such
force in defense of its airspace "after serious consideration." While
it may be seen as hypocrisy engendered by finding the shoe on
the other foot, the incidents may be distinguished. It is clear that
in the Sinai incident, Israel was invoking the so-called "security
necessity" element raised by the United States in its Memorial
against Bulgaria. While rejected by the ICAO Council based on
its investigation report, Israel was apparently trying to couple this
security necessity with the airliner's failure to follow instructions
as sufficient justification for the use of force. Further, the Israeli
Memorial submitted to the International Court on the Bulgarian
incident was not categorical in its rejection of the use of force
against intruders. It condemned the disproportionate degree of
violence employed by Bulgaria. In the Sinai incident, Israel ap-
parently felt that a disproportionate use of force was not em-
ployed. The ICAO investigation concluded otherwise.
Returning to the action by Israel, the United Kingdom, and
the United States against Bulgaria before the International Court
of Justice, certain legal arguments advanced give additional in-
sight into state opinion on the content of the principle governing
the use of force on intruders. All three Memorials before the.
...ICAO Council Resolution of June 4, 1973, ICAO Bulletin 13 (July, 1973).
"1 See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
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International Court cited with approval the decision in the Corfu
Channel' case. The judgment was advanced as evidence that
international law condemns actions by states which in time of
peace unnecessarily or recklessly involve risk to the lives of the
nationals of other states or of their property. Yet it must be noted
that the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel case
did not announce that it considered the use of force against citi-
zens of other states to be illegal under international law. It was
the unnecessary or reckless use of force against such persons which
the court held to be violative of "elementary considerations of
humanity even more exacting in peace than in war." The court
stressed that Albania had a duty to warn shipping vessels of the
presence of a mine field in its territorial waters; not that the mining
itself was illegal under international law.""
The British and American Memorials also cited approvingly the
case of Garcia v. United States."' This case supports the notion
that "elementary considerations of humanity" are not subject to
"black letter law" but are in fact subject to a weighing process in
each instance. Whether a certain act by a state is violative of
law must be viewed as a question of proportionality. The ICAO
Commission held in the Garcia case that the act of firing by the
state officer was illegal "unless the importance of preventing or
repressing the delinquency by firing is in proportion to the danger
arising from it.. . " nor should it be used "when other practicable
ways of preventing or repressing the delinquency might be avail-
able.""
The view that all other means of terminating the unauthorized
entry must be exhausted before using force against an intruding
airliner was in fact implicitly recognized by Bulgaria. The Bul-
garian government in a statement issued on August 3, 1955, ulti-
mately conceded that the EIA1 airliner was shot down by Bul-
garian fighters, promised to prevent a repetition of such incidents,
and agreed to pay compensation for the loss of life to the families
113 [1949] I.C.J. 4.
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of the victims.' The statement admitted that, based on findings
of the ministerial commission of inquiry, the air defenses had
"shown hastiness" and had failed to take all necessary measures to
force the aircraft to change direction."' The Bulgarians apparently
recognized that it was this failure to exhaust all other measures
which rendered them liable for the resulting damages caused by
their interceptors.
The presence of a security necessity coupled with an apparent
exhaustion of other measures may explain the total lack of pro-
test against the Soviet Union when armed force was employed to
terminate the intrusion into its airspace by the Korean airliner
on April 20, 1978. The use of force under the factual situation
surrounding the incident was, it is submitted, viewed as lawful
by other states.
The intrusion by the KAL plane may be considered the most
serious intrusion among the incidents reviewed. The airliner had
not merely strayed off course, it was in fact ninety degrees off
course and had penetrated deep into the Soviet Union...9 The area
where the airliner was ultimately intercepted, moreover, is a Soviet
high security zone which is closed to all foreigners." Finally,
accepting the facts as reported by Tass which remain unchallenged,
the KAL airliner's crew failed to obey the demands of the Soviet
fighters to follow them in order to land at an airfield although the
pilot and navigator admitted that they had understood such de-
mands."' Thus, it appears that the Soviet Union, claiming a security
necessity to require the aircraft to land, provided the airliner's
pilot with a safe alternative which was rejected. The use of force
was, therefore, properly one of last resort.
IV. CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR THE
TREATMENT OF INTRUDING CIVIL AIRLINERS
It is submitted then that international customary law as evi-
denced by state opinion and practice, articulates certain standards
"
71KEESINGS CONTEMPORARY ARCHIVES 14359 (August, 1955). See text ac-
companying notes 52 and 53 supra.
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for the treatment of intruding civil airliners by offended terri-
torial states. Both international customary law and the Chicago
Convention of 1944 reject the use of force against such aerial
intruders as a primary remedy for the territorial state. The offended
territorial state normally has two lawful remedies in dealing with
intrusion by civil airliners. One or both of these two remedies
may be employed. First, the territorial state must indicate to the
airliner in an appropriate and effective manner, without causing
an undue degree of physical danger to the aircraft and its occu-
pants, that it is performing an unauthorized act. While exercising
due care, the territorial state may require the intruder to return
to its authorized position, within or without the airspace of the
state in question, or to submit itself to examination after landing
at an airfield adequate for the type of aircraft in the territory of
the state in question, effectively indicated to the intruder in an
appropriate manner. Secondly, and subsequently, the territorial
state may deal with the infringement of its sovereignty by making
appropriate protests or demands through diplomatic channels.
The use of force against intruding civil airliners is narrowly
limited by international customary law. Firing on such an aircraft
can be considered lawful only if the following three criteria are
satisfied:
(1) It is necessary to effect a landing for the security of the
offended territorial state;
(2) The importance of discontinuing the intrusion by firing
upon the aircraft is in reasonable proportion to the danger
to the territorial state arising from it; and, most importantly,
(3) All other practicable means of discontinuing the intrusion
have been exhausted-the aircraft has refused to comply
with clear and appropriate instructions to return to author-
ized airspace or follow interceptors to a designated airfield
adequate for the type of aircraft involved.
If any of the above criteria are not satisfied, the offending terri-
torial state cannot lawfully bring down the intruder with armed
force. The state will be left with the normal remedies prescribed by
international customary law and the 1944 Chicago Convention.
